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Abstract
Is racial hate reflected in the degree of judicial corruption? Using US state-level data, we find
racial hate to be a positive and statistically powerful predictor of judicial corruption. This
relationship prevails after the inclusion of the conventional control variables and regional
fixed effects. In terms of magnitude, one standard deviation increase of racial hate relates
to an increase of 70 percent of one standard deviation in corruption. Interestingly, no such
relationship can be found for corruption in the executive or legislative branch.
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1 Introduction
Once again, heated discussions about racism have returned to the US media spotlight with the
trial of Trayvon Martin’s shooting in Florida in 2012, the pending trial on Michael Brown’s
shooting in Missouri in 2014, and several other incidents. Eventually, the shooter of Martin has
been found not guilty and ensuing allegations of racial considerations entering this decision have
been abundant. The accusations focus on the claim that, even today, the judicial branch in the
US can be racially biased.
This paper provides an empirical analysis of the hypothesis that racial hate is intimately
related to corruption in the US judicial branch. Previous works have suggested racial disparities
in federal sentences against African-Americans (Rehavi and Starr, 2014) and the selection of
jury members (see Bourke et al., 2003, for Alabama; Initiative, 2010, for Louisiana). Thus,
historical scars of racism may still linger in the US justice system.
2 Data and Methodology
We use a novel state-level data set on corruption in the US, assembled by the Safra Center for
ethics at Harvard University (Dincer and Johnston, 2015). Distinguishing between corruption in
the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, this measure extends general corruption indices
(e.g., Boylan and Long, 2003). We focus on corruption in the judicial branch, but also analyze
the other two areas. For each branch, the researchers derive indicators for legal and illegal
corruption. Legal corruption is defined as
[T]he political gains in the form of campaign contributions or endorsements by a
government official, in exchange for providing specific benefits to private individuals
or groups, be it by explicit or implicit understanding.
Similarly,
illegal corruption is the private gains in the form of cash or gifts by a government
official, in exchange for providing specific benefits to private individuals or groups.
Each index ranges from one to four with corruption increasing with higher numbers. Similar to
cross-country measures, this index is based on surveys, questioning reporters who have studied
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related cases. Employing survey responses carries several advantages over the use of the number
of public officials convicted by federal agencies (see Alt and Lassen, 2008, and Cordis and Milyo,
2013, for details).
Our measure for racial hate is taken from Stephens-Davidowitz (2014), who accesses Google
trends data to create a racially charged search rate that includes the “n-word.” The derived
index produces a maximum value of 100, which identifies the largest degree of racial hate. We
construct the following cross-sectional OLS analysis for state i:
Corruptioni = α0 + α1(Racial hate)i + x
′
iα2 + i, (1)
where x
′
i incorporates the conventional corruption determinants derived by the associated lit-
erature: GDP per capita, population size, the share of government employment, education, in
addition to binary indicators for four US regions (midwest, northeast, and south; west being the
reference category) and ethnic population shares (African-American, Hispanic, Native Ameri-
can, and Asian; white forming the reference category).1 Summary statistics with all variables,
including sources and descriptions, are displayed in Table 1.
3 Empirical Findings
Table 2 displays our main findings, predicting corruption in the judicial branch. Columns (1)-(3)
assess legal corruption, whereas columns (4)-(6) estimate illegal corruption. Finally, column (7)
displays results from deriving an average of legal and illegal corruption.
Beginning with a univariate regression framework, we then include regional fixed effects and
ethnic compositions, before adding the complete set of control variables described in equation
1. Throughout all estimations, racial hate emerges as a positive predictor, with the estimated
coefficient being statistically significant on the one percent level.
In terms of magnitude, a one standard deviation of racial hate (0.14) is associated with an
increase of 0.51 and 0.33 index points in the index measuring legal and illegal corruption. When
both indices are averaged, an increase in 0.42 index points is suggested. With the index ranging
1For corruption determinants in the US, see Glaeser and Saks (2006). For corruption determinants on the
country-level, see Treisman (2000) or Serra (2006).
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Table 2: Results from OLS regressions, estimating corruption in the judicial branch.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: Legal Judicial Corruption Illegal Judicial Corruption Judicial
Corruption
Racial hate 2.717∗∗∗ 4.061∗∗∗ 3.641∗∗∗ 1.419∗∗∗ 2.313∗∗∗ 2.375∗∗∗ 3.008∗∗∗
(0.685) (0.969) (1.168) (0.360) (0.418) (0.632) (0.806)
Region FE & ethnicity yes yes yes yes yes
Control variablesa yes yes yes
N 49 49 49 49 49 49 49
Adjusted R2 0.219 0.425 0.427 0.157 0.412 0.433 0.507
Notes: White robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. aIncludes Ln(GDP/capita),
Ln(population size), % government employment, and % of people over 25 years with a bachelor’s degree.
between one and four, these quantitative interpretations are remarkable, corresponding to 70
percent of a standard deviation.
Table 3 presents estimates from several robustness checks and extensions, using column (7) of
Table 2 as a reference point. The results in column (1) come from an ordered probit estimation,
which may provide a more precise methodology when estimating an ordinal dependent variable.
Columns (2)-(6) incorporate additional control variables that may confound the relevance of
racial hate: Institutional regulations, an alternative variable for educational attainment, patrio-
tism, the share of regular church-attendees, and the share of Protestants. All of these variables
have been suggested to affect corruption by previous studies (see Treisman, 2000, for example).
In all estimations, the coefficient related to racial hate retains its statistical importance,
with the corresponding magnitude ranging from 2.6 to 3.5 (the quantitative interpretation of
the ordered probit regression is different from an OLS coefficient). Finally, columns (7) and (8)
check whether corruption in the executive and legislative branch is also related to racial hate.
However, we find no such evidence.
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Table 3: Robustness checks.
(1)a (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable: Judicial Corruption Executive Legislative
Corruption Corruption
Racial hate 9.923∗∗∗ 2.895∗∗∗ 2.672∗∗∗ 2.815∗∗∗ 3.465∗∗∗ 2.567∗∗ 0.425 2.310
(2.939) (0.932) (0.795) (0.846) (0.852) (0.981) (1.675) (1.617)
Regulation -0.156
(0.824)
Education -0.020
(0.012)
Patriotism 0.015
(0.016)
% attending church 1.603
(1.116)
% Protestants 0.705
(0.789)
Region FE, ethnicity yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
& control variablesb
N 49 49 49 49 49 47 49 49
Adjusted R2 0.493 0.518 0.503 0.514 0.484 0.201 0.429
Notes: White robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. aResults from an ordered
probit estimation (command oprobit in Stata). bIncludes Ln(GDP/capita), Ln(population size), % government
employment, and % of people over 25 years with a bachelor’s degree.
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4 Conclusion
Is racial hate associated with corruption in the judicial branch? Using data for 49 states (exclud-
ing Louisiana because of missing data), we find a positive and statistically significant relation-
ship. A one standard deviation increase of racial hate corresponds to an increase of 70 percent
of a standard deviation in corruption (or 0.42 index points on a scale from 1-4). This result is
robust to the inclusion of the conventional control variables and regional fixed effects. Further,
corruption in the executive and legislative branches does not seem to be related to racial hate.
Although it is always difficult to isolate strict causality in macroeconomic variables, the
strength and robustness of this finding suggests a meaningful relationship between racial hate
and corruption in the judicial branch. Promising future studies could consider micro-level data
(e.g., surveys) to analyze the exact underlying dynamics.
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